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NOTES AND COMMENTS
port with modern marketing. It remains to be seen, however, whether
without legislative action the courts will allow variable price contracts to
be enforced against non-signers or, indeed, if the Supreme Court would
include variable pricing within the purview of the McGuire Act.
D. P. RABUN
DISMISSAL OF CLASS ACTIONS; THE SMALL
CLAIM PLAINTIFF AND THE DOCTRINE OF
FINALITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Today the individual consumer seems to be increasingly aware that
he is subject to a wide range of economic abuses in the marketplace.'
Through the medium of the class action,2 however, the consumer may
find that he can join with others similarly situated and seek redress of
their aggregate injuries.' A dismissal of such a class action, which leaves
the potential class representative to prosecute only his individual claim,
can have a distinct impact on his substantive rights. If the personal claim
is relatively small, he may be unwilling or unable to pursue an action
against the corporate entity.' This is especially true in a consumer action
where resolution of the issues will involve such complex facts and intricate
law that redress would be likely to entail expenses totally dispropor-
'Protecting the consumer from abuse in the marketplace is not altogether a recent
phenomenon. As early as 1906 consumers were deemed to have a cause of action under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1-7, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 28 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970, when they were victims of monopoly price fixing. Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906). Nevertheless, significant
consumer reliance upon the courts for redress of economic injuries seems to be a relatively
recent development. See Scher, Antitrust and Consumerism: What is it all About?, 22 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 11 (1970).
2FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue ... as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class, (3) the claims . . . of the representative parties are
typical of the claims . . . of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
3See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970),formerly ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731 (1914). Note 14 and accompanying text infra.
4Other than the class action, the procedural alternatives available for handling multiple
litigation-intervention, joinder, consolidation-presuppose "a group of economically pow-
erful parties who are obviously able and willing to take care of their own interests individu-
ally through individual suits or individual decisions about joinder or intervention." Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 295, 298
(1966).
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tionate to any of the individual claims.' Consequently, it seems that the
reality of judicial relief for the consumer holding a small claim may in
fact depend exclusively on the availability of a class action suit.'
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets out in detail the
prerequisites for a class action yet Rule 23(c)(1) leaves it within the
discretion of the trial court to decide whether the class action shall be
maintained.' An order, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), which dismisses the
class action allegations may effectively prevent an adjudication of the
merits of the consumer action. Whether such an order is final and thus
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 12911 is an unsettled issue.
In Hackett v. General Host Corp.,"0 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was confronted with the issue of the appealability of an adverse
Rule 23(c)(1) order which left a single plaintiff to litigate her small dam-
age claim." Plaintiff had filed an antitrust class action complaint on
behalf of herself and one and one-half million consumers similarly situ-
ated.' 2 The action was brought under the Clayton Act 3 seeking treble
5See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965).
The successful plaintiff in an antitrust action is entitled under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)
to treble damages, attorney's fees and costs. Nevertheless he must be prepared for "the
certainty that he will incur several thousand dollars in costs before trial is reached." Dweyer,
Proof of Injury-Elements of Damage, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 199, 206 (1968).
A leading antitrust lawyer suggested that the costs alone in suing a "great" corporation
might amount to as much as $25,000. Hearings on the Role of Private Antitrust Enforce-
ment in Protecting Small Business Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Small
Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. at 164 (1958).
'This comment will focus primarily upon a case arising in the field of antitrust litiga-
tion. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The class action, however, may also have a substantial
impact on the specific areas of federal securities regulation; see [15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964)];
civil rights [28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)]; and truth-in-lending [15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970)].
In each of these situations the statute provides for federal jurisdiction regardless of the
amount in controversy. In 1969 the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Rule 23
permitted aggregation of claims for purposes of jurisdictional amount. Snyder v. Harris,
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b). Note 2 supra and note 16 infra.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides in part:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained.
928 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ....
"ONo. 19,320 (3d Cir., Jan. 14, 1972).
"The case arose subsequent to an indictment which charged that General Host Corpo-
ration and other named defendants had conspired to fix prices and terms of sale of bread
in the Philadelphia market. Id. at 2.
"2Plaintiff had purchased bread at retail from defendants and claimed that the price-
fixing had injured her personally to the extent of nine dollars. Id.
"Note 3 supra.
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damages, costs and attorney's fees 4 for alleged violations of sections one
and two of the Sherman Act. 5
The district court determined that the class which the plaintiff sought
to represent was unmanageable 6 and pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1) disal-
lowed 7 the class aspect of the allegations." Plaintiff filed an appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, contending that the Rule 23(c)(1) order was a final
order within the scope of that section. 9
The plaintiffs theory was that no attorney would undertake to repre-
"Through the Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1971),formerly ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat.
731 (1914), Congress apparently hoped to make the antitrust laws self-enforcing. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States . . . and shall recover three-fold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
It was expected that the provisions for a treble damage remedy would encourage private
prosecution. The courts have repeatedly emphasized that the treble damage action was
intended not only to redress personal injuries, but also to aid in achieving the broader
purposes of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358,
365 (9th Cir. 1955); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893
(5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955). See generally Note, Standing to Sue for
Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
'515 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
"eRule 23(b) enumerates three alternative requirements which, in addition to the prere-
quisites of Rule 23(b) [see note 2 supra], must be met in order to maintain a class action.
Rule 23(b)(3) provides that the court may allow a class action if it
finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include . . . the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
The management difficulties inherent in representing a large class usually relate to the
requirements concerning notice to the individual class members. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2). Various procedures have been suggested for overcoming these difficulties. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1970); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568-70 (2d Cir. 1968) (3,750,000 individual and corporate buyers
in the class); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 48 F.R.D. 7, 15 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See
generally Note, Federal Rule 23(c)(2)-Notice In Class Actions-Mullane Reconsidered,
43 TUL. L. REV. 369 (1969).
17Note 8 and accompanying text supra.
'8The district court denied plaintiffs subsequent request that it certify its order for
appeal in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). Note 58 and accompanying text
infra.
"No. 19,320 at 3.
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sent her in a complex and lengthy antitrust action in which she had only
a nine-dollar personal claim.2" She argued that the practical result of the
district court's order was the termination of the litigation and that as such
it was a final order.21 The court of appeals-disagreed and dismissed the
motion for appeal.2 2 It reasoned that due to the statutory provision for
attorney's fees and costs in the litigation,23 there was no conclusive basis
for the assertion that plaintiff would be unable to secure counsel to repre-
sent her.
24
Hackett is significant because the Third Circuit rejected any applica-
tion of the "death knell" rule which first appeared in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.25 In that case plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated against odd-lot dealers on the
New York Stock Exchange. The district court refused to permit the
action to be maintained as a class action, in effect limiting plaintiff to
his token seventy dollar individual claim. 2 The Second Circuit allowed
an appeal of this order under section 1291 stating that:
We can safely assume that no lawyer of competence is going
to undertake this complex and costly case to recover $70 for Mr.
Eisen. . . .If the appeal is dismissed, not only will Eisen's claims
never be adjudicated, but no appellate court will be given the
chance to decide if this class action was proper under the newly
amended Rule 23.
. ..Where the effect of a district court's order if not reviewed,
is the death knell of the action, review should be allowed.2?
Since the district court's order dismissing the Eisen class action would
have had the practical effect of terminating the litigation, the order would
not have been reviewable at all if appellate consideration could have taken
place only after a final adjudication of the merits of the action. Through
application of the death knell rule, the appellate court acknowledged that
denial of an appeal of the order could have effectively precluded adequate
judicial review of any aspect of the class action.?
The considerations which allowed an appeal in Eisen may seem to
21Id. at 2-4.
2'Id. at 3-4.
22Judge Rosenn entered a strong dissent. Id. at 14-26.
-15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
2 No. 19,320 at 7.
-370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
26Like in Hackett v. General Host Corp. [No. 19,320, at 1-2], the statute under which
Mr. Eisen brought his claim contained a provision for the award of attorney's fees. See 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970). 370 F.2d at 119-210.
370 F.2d at 120-21.
2Id.
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contrast with the notion of overcrowded dockets" and the resulting policy
of judicial economy in the courts. Federal law expresses this policy of
judicial economy through both judicial0 and legislative3' hostility to-
ward piecemeal appeals. In addition, this hostility is due to the potential
for harassment of litigants through nuisance appeals and the fact that any
appeal tends to delay trial or settlement of lawsuits .3  The statutory
framework provides that subject to certain explicit exceptions, 3 the
appealability of interlocutory orders under section 1291 depends upon a
judicial determination that such orders fall within the category of final
orders."
The central issue raised by Hackett involves the scope of section 1291.
The appellate court, however, was not confronted with a final decision
which was intended to complete the litigation. 5 Rather, it considered an
order which was addressed to an issue tangential to the principal litiga-
tion. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,3 certain of these
orders were termed collateral orders and held immediately appealable as
final decisions due to their irrevocable effect upon claims separable from
the substantive issues of the litigation. 7 The district court's order in
2See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
"Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966). Justice
Harlan consistently dissented from the line of cases expanding the notion of finality. In
Mercantile Nat'i Bank v. Langdeau he wrote:
The Court's decision in these appeals throws the law of finality into
a state of great uncertainty and will, I am afraid, tend to increase future
efforts at piecemeal review.
371 U.S. 555, 575 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
31Congress expressed its policy by the promulgations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(b).
Under either section a trial court's order would have to meet certain criteria to be appeala-
ble. Note 9 supra and note 58 infra.
3See, e.g., American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d
2779 278 (2d Cir. 1967).
3Note 74 infra.
2It should be noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970) does not define the term "final
order."
3The Supreme Court has said that a final decision may be "one which ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
-337 U.S. 541 (1949).
3Cohen involved a stockholder's suit in which the defendant corporation appealed
from the denial of a motion to require the plaintiff to post security for the defendant's costs.
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a unanimous Court as to the appealability of the order
stated:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally deter-
mine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in
the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
19721
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Hackett was arguably of such a nature as to bring the decision within the
collateral order doctrine of Cohen." Not only was the order denying
Hackett's class action allegation a determination of a claim separable
from the merits of the antitrust action, but that order would also not be
reviewable if the litigation did not continue.
The development of the death knell doctrine in Eisen,39 however, was
founded upon a concept of finality more fundamental to the outcome of
the action than the collateral order doctrine would require. The collateral
order doctrine is addressed to determinations which, though made during
the course of the litigation, do not impede the progress of the lawsuit. On
the other hand, the death knell doctrine permitted an appeal in Eisen
based upon the consideration that the purported interlocutory order of
the district court effectively terminated the entire litigation. Support for
this approach came from Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,0 where
the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether a certain
interlocutory order was appealable under section 1291.1' Conceding that
it would be impossible to devise a strict formula for resolving cases com-
ing within what it termed the "'twilight zone' of finality," the Court
invoked the Cohen requirement that finality be given a "practical rather
than a technical construction. ' 2 A trial court's order may, as in Hackett,
technically allow the plaintiff to continue with his action. Nevertheless,
the further Gillespie consideration of "the danger of denying justice by
delay [of review]" 43 seems to allow the courts of appeal to focus upon
whether an order has the practical effect of terminating the litigation. The
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated.
We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a
claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does
not require consideration with it.
337 U.S. 541, 546-47. See Roberts v. District Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (denial of petition
to proceed in forma pauperis held to be an order sufficiently collateral to the merits and of
sufficient importance to permit review as a final decision).
-"Judge Rosenn, the dissenting judge in Hackett, would have held the collateral order
sufficient to permit an appeal. No. 19,320 at 25-26 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
"Notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
40379 U.S. 148 (1964).
"In Gillespie the question was whether the Court had jurisdiction to review the denial
of several causes of action for wrongful death under maritime law. The causes of action
involved joinder of the decedent's dependent brothers and sisters, and the district court's
order foreclosed their participation in the action.
'2379 U.S. at 152, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949).
1379 U.S. at 153. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950).
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Eisen court balanced the inconvenience of piecemeal litigation44 against
the danger of denying justice and found that the latter was the predomi-
nant interest."
By contrast the Hackett court found that there was an insignificant
chance that the plaintiff's litigation would terminate and accordingly
attributed a much smaller weight to this factor." Thus Hackett presents
a framework for consideration of the practical effect of a district court's
order which revokes a class action designation and leaves the potential
class representative to litigate his small personal claim. Prior to Hackett
it seemed that the courts would attribute significance to the small size of
the individual plaintiff's claim. 7 Hackett, however, appeared to minimize
that consideration. The decision consequently reflects a controversy con-
cerning the proper criteria to be applied in resolving whether it may be
practical for the plaintiff to continue with his litigation.,'
There is scant empirical data relating the size of a litigant's claim to
the potential availability of counsel. 9 Consumer class litigation will fre-
quently arise in a statutory context which provides that attorney's fees
and costs will be awarded to the successful plaintiff." Nevertheless, it
"Notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
11370 F.2d at 120.
"8No. 19,320 at 7-8.
'The plaintiff in Hackett had only a nine dollar personal claim, No. 19,320 at 2.
Interestingly, this was smaller than the claims of previous class representatives in decisions
where the death knell rule was held to permit appeal. Se Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) ($386 individual claim); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969) ($1000 individual claim); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) ($70 individual
claim).
"8See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (appeal from an order
denying class action designation in securities action where actual loss to plaintiff was $386
and denying review of the dismissal would sound death knell of the action); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967); cf. Caceres
v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970); City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
"Cursory attempts have been made to relate legal scholarship to an attorney's financial
success. Garrison, A Survey of the Wisconsin Bar, 10 Wis. L. REv. 131, 161-65 (1935);
Payne, "And The 'C' Students Make the Money"??, 18 ALA. L. REV. 23 (1966).
It should be noted that financially successful and purportedly competent attorneys,
experienced in antitrust and securities fraud litigation, have attributed their financial status
to their "ability to refuse" a doubtful case. See Gadflies Who Put the Bite on Business,
Bus NEss WEEK, Oct. 14, 1967, at 124. These attorneys exhorted private enforcement of
antitrust actions [under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)] whichfallow the injured party to recover
treble damages, considering such an award to be more effective than the maximum $50,000
fine. They had no experience with cases of the small scale of Mrs. Hackett's claim in which
treble damages would amount to only twenty-seven dollars.
wThere was such a provision underlying the actions in both Hackett and Eisen. Both
actions were brought for violations of sections one and two of the Sherman Act. Thus, an
1972]
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seems to be generally accepted that complex and lengthy antitrust ac-
tions5 require a substantial amount in controversy to warrant the interest
of either the plaintiff or his attorney. 2 Though seldom articulated, a lack
of interest in antitrust actions may well turn on the fact that the plaintiff
will bear his fees and court costs if the suit is unsuccessful.53 The individ-
ual consumer may simply be unwilling to take that risk. The death knell
rule as applied in a line of decisions in the Second Circuit reflects implicit
consideration of this factor. The resulting determination was that dis-
missal of class action allegations would probably cause the practical
termination of the small-claim consumer's action. 4 In contrast, Hackett
weighed its assumption of a minimal danger of denying plaintiff access
to the courts5  against the policies which protect the court from piecemeal
litigation56 and denied the appeal.
Moreover, Hackett also assumed that there were alternative channels
of appellate remedy open to the plaintiff and weighed this as a factor
opposed to interlocutory review through section 1291. 57 The court con-
cluded that by certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),58 certifica-
tion pursuant to Rule 54(b),59 or petition for writ of mandamus under 28
award of fees would have been contingent upon prevailing in the action. See 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970).
5 1Note 5 and accompanying text supra.
52 d.
"In no statutes are the attorney's fees granted as of right. Generally they will be
awarded to the party prevailing in the action. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Moreover,
the award of these fees may further depend upon the discretion of the trial court. See 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
"See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
mNo. 19,320 at 7.
58Notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
57No. 19,320 at 8-9.
-28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970) is also known as the Interlocutory Appeals Act. It added
subsection (b) to section 1292 to "expedite the ultimate termination of the litigation and
thereby save unnecessary expense and delay." H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1958). Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order. . . .shall
be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim . . . is presented in an action . . . the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims. . ..
See notes 64-65 and accompanying text infra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
U.S.C. § 1651,60 the consumer class action could be protected against an
unreceptive district court.6 A section 1292(b) appeal requires the discre-
tionary approval of both the district court and the court of appeals.
Under Rule 54(b) appeal is within the discretion of the district court,
while review pursuant to section 1651 is within the discretion of the court
of appeals. In each case an appeal would follow if the appropriate court
determined that the harm that could be caused by denying access to
review outweighed considerations opposed to piecemeal litigation." Ac-
cordingly, the nature of these alternate channels of review seemed to
comport with the forceful policy of judicial economy.
Analysis of the operation and effect of the alternate modes of review,
however, reveals that they may be of illusory assistance to the potential
class representative who is subject to an order which dismisses the class
action aspect of the litigation. In the first place, section 1292(b) is avail-
able as a means of review only if the trial judge makes a discretionary
determination that immediate appeal of his order would be essential to
the litigation."3 If he fails to certify the order for appeal, section 1292(b)
ceases to be a potential mode of review. If he does certify the order, then
the court of appeals makes the final determination whether to allow or
disallow the appeal.
Secondly, a district court judge could direct pursuant to Rule 54(b)64
that his order dismissing a class action allegation be entered as "a final
judgment as to one . . . of the claims" in the action. 5 As under section
1292(b), the determination would be within the discretion of the trial
judge and failure to certify would effectively preclude the litigant's use
of the Rule 54(b) appeal. Thirdly, the potential consumer class represent-
ative will find that the use of the section 1651 writs of mandamus has been
sharply limited. They are generally not to be used as substitutes for
appeal.6 The successful petitioner for mandamus must demonstrate an
1028 U.S.C. § 1651(a) provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
Traditional use of mandamus under section 1651 has been to confine an inferior court
to the exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-
10 (1964).
O'No. 19,320 at 8-9.
62 d. at 8-10.
-28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (1970).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); note 57 supra.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
"See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964) (writ appropriately issued however
when there is a "usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion"). The Supreme Court
in Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947), asserted in regard to petitions for mandamus:
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abuse of discretion rather than mere discretionary error in the district
court's adverse ruling. 7 It would seem, therefore, that the three alterna-
tive modes of review may be of little use to the consumer plaintiff who
has received an order dismissing his class action. The availability of an
appeal under section 1291 may consequently depend upon a realization
by the court of appeals that not only may the district court's order, if
unreviewed, practically terminate the litigation, but also that the alternate
channels of review may not in fact be available.
In Hackett, the appellate court determined that the policy opposed to
piecemeal litigation outweighed the slight chance that the district court's
order would terminate the litigation.68 Due in part to the uncertainty of
the result of the order,69 Hackett did not find the order to be final within
the scope of section 1291.11
A more obvious instance of the practical effect of an adverse district
court order was presented to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Brunson v. Board of Trustees.7' There the court dealt with a procedural
issue analogous to that which arose in Hackett. In Brunson forty-two
school children brought a class action seeking general injunctive relief
against a school board which was maintaining an allegedly segregated
school system. 72 The district court ruled that each plaintiff would be
limited to an individual action seeking admission to a particular school.73
The Fourth Circuit held that the order striking the class aspect of the
complaint had the practical effect of denying the broad injunctive relief
sought by the parties and that the order was thus appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 74 In Brunson there was little need to weigh consider-
ations opposed to piecemeal litigation because section 1292(a) encompas-
We are unwilling to utilize them as substitutes for appeals. As extraordi-
nary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary causes.
"Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956).
"'No. 19,320 at 7-10.
69
1d.
7 Id. at 3-10.
71311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962).
7"Id. at 107-08.
73 d. at 108.
7128 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970) allows appeal as of right from certain interlocutory or-
ders by the district court. It provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . ..
(2) . . . orders appointing recievers . ..
(3) . . . decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of the
parties to admiralty cases . ..
(4) Judgements in civil actions for patent infringement which are
final except for accounting.
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ses four specific orders-injunction, receivership, admiralty, and patent
infringement 75-which, in addition to orders found to be final under sec-
tion 1291, are appealable as of right. Since the practical effect of the
district court's order clearly brought it within the scope of the injunction
provision of 1292(a)(1), appeal was allowed.7"
In contrast to Brunson, the uncertainty of the practical effect of the
district court's order in Hackett required a more definitive balancing
approach by the circuit court. The balancing was complicated, however,
by indistinct notions of the relation of either the death knell rule" or the
policy against piecemeal litigation" to the procedural aspects of the case.
The Third Circuit in Hackett was dealing with an order which was not
addressed to the merits of the antitrust action,7 yet which possibly had
the practical effect of terminating consideration of the substantive issues
of the case. The court seems to have had difficulty with the Eisen death
knell approach due to its subsequent applications by the Second Circuit."
What had been perceived in Eisen as the necessity of weighing the danger
of terminating the litigation against the policy opposed to piecemeal
litigation8' appeared to evolve in the Second Circuit as an automatic
inquiry into the amount of the individual plaintiffs claim.82 Judge Rosenn
acknowledged the weakness of such an arbitrary formula in his dissent
in Hackett."' He sought a return to the focus of the balancing concept
of Gillespie and Eisen.'
In Hackett, the district court's order left plaintiffs small damage
claim to stand alone in a complex and costly antitrust suit. A determina-
tion of the effect of that order clearly requires consideration of factors
beyond the mere technical permission for plaintiff to continue with his
75The fifth interlocutory order which is automatically appealable is an order in bank-
ruptcy. I 1 U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
7"By comparison, the consumer class action dismissal cases focus upon the question of
whether the district court's order practically terminates the litigation so as to be within the
ambit of finality under section 1291.
7Notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
7"Notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
7"See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); note 37 supra.
&'See Korn v. Franchard, 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Caceres v. International Air
Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970); City of New York v. International Pipe &
Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
81See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
8E.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); City of New York v.
International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).
8No. 19,320 at 20-21 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
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personal action. 5 The Supreme Court in Gillespie did not require the
certainty of a technical interpretation of the district court's order. Instead
it emphasized the practical consequences. Nevertheless, the Hackett deci-
sion seemed to stress the fact that plaintiff's personal claim had not been
formally dismissed by the district court and that she was therefore techni-
cally able to pursue her individual action. Thus the court was not per-
suaded by the possibility or probability that the action would necessarily
terminate."6 Instead its determination relied on the lack of a conclusive
basis for the assumption that Hackett could not continue the litigation."1
Furthermore, the position taken by the court of appeals in Hackett
seems actually to interfere with the underlying practical purpose of judi-
cial economy. 8 The court postulates that the plaintiff's meager claim
would not deter an attorney from taking up the antitrust suit. If this were
in fact the case, an intolerable overcrowding of the district court dockets
would follow89 as each party injured by the defendant corporation sought
to recover individual damages. In addition, each action would be subject
to appellate review after final decision by the district court. Viewed in this
light, the Hackett decision not to review the district court's dismissal of
the class action seems to contrast with the policies against multiple litiga-
tion and multiple appeals.
Whether a district court order dismissing consumer class action alle-
gations is final with regard to the potential class representative may
largely depend upon the circuit court in which he files his complaint. The
court of appeals in Hackett sought a positive basis for finding that the
plaintiff's litigation would terminate. Finding none, it determined that the
district court's order was less than a final decision under section 1291.
The court also asserted that alternate appellate channels would permit
continuation of plaintiff's action. It would seem that neither determina-
tion affected the practical approach to finality as described in Gillespie0
and applied by the Second Circuit in Eisen."
The unsettled issue of finality and resultant appealability of an ad-
verse Rule 23(c)(1) order appears to warrant the establishment of unify-
"Notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
"The majority's argument that the plaintiff may be able to rely upon the services of a
publicly supported legal aid program can be rebutted by the fact that such organizations
usually do not pursue contingent fee cases. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 20 (undated).
"No. 19,320 at 7.
m'See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969).
81See generally, Id. at 548. Carrington foresees dire consequences arising from the
predicted increase in the number of actions docketed.
"Notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
"Notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
